> In article <48f7af9b.0402201510.c73a38fposting.google.com> ,
> [email]william_arensemainc.com[/email] says...
> > While reviewing the DoD 5200.28-STD "DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TRUSTED
> > COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA" doent and looking over
> > "Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing (ADP)
> > Systems," for Federal systems requiring C2 compliance I realized
> > that I do not understand the distinction between Solaris and
> > Trusted Solaris.
> Trusted Solaris assigns "labels" to all the files, data, devices, users
> and processes and takes great pains to make sure that everything with
> the same label is isolated from stuff with other labels, subject to
> exceptions defined by a user called the "security manager". This is
> called mandatory security because the users have no choice in what the
> labels are or how they are managed. (Well, the security manager can
> specify all that when the OS is first installed, but that's it.) In
> addition to that, TSOL employs the familiar concepts of users, groups
> and permissions (the discretionary security stuff).
> Regular Solaris has no concept of labels. It simply employs the
> concepts of users, groups and permission settings.
> > On the issue of Accountability(auditing)
> > 1. Can Unix machines using only the syslogd facility meet 'C2'
> > or higher?
> Not sure, but I doubt it. I think you need to log more detail than
> syslog offers. (We need a syslog expert for this one.)
> > 2. Does Trusted Solaris offer any system resource advantage
> > (CPU and Disk utilization) over Solaris using BSM when
> > the need for accountability requires 'C2' level of logging?
> Not that I've seen.